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Il saggio si propone di esaminare le questioni sollevate dalla elettronificazione e 
digitalizzazione dei pagamenti al dettaglio secondo un approccio umanistico e gius-economico, 
attento alla più recente evoluzione del quadro giuridico europeo su sistemi di pagamento, 
valute virtuali e complementari. Il saggio, diviso in due parti, si occupa nella Parte I del 
concetto di valore negli scambi monetari prestando attenzione alla relazione concettuale, 
stabilita da Mangan nella sua produzione artistica, tra l’antica valuta dell’isola di Yap, il rai, 
in pietra, e la valuta virtuale del bitcoin. I rispettivi percorsi di produzione, consumo, 
circolazione e rivalutazione delle due monete sono correlati alla relazione tra valute locali/ 
complementari da un lato e valute globali/virtuali dall’altro, in modo da prestare attenzione a 
come il valore monetario originariamente“forgiato” attraverso il criterio (chiuso) 
dell’appartenenza ad una comunità cambi quando “ceduto” ad un mercato (aperto) dominato 
dalla tecnologia. Nella Parte II, il saggio esamina l’approccio dell'Unione Europea alla 
moneta e ai sistemi di pagamento, concentrandosi sulle principali caratteristiche dei sistemi 
“regolari” e quelli virtuali, concludendo che difficilmente il ricorso al bitcoin o ad altre valute 
virtuali può sciogliere i nodi della governance dei sistemi di pagamento tradizionali e 
dell’accesso al credito: la sostenibilità e la nuova crescita che le valute virtuali e globali 
promettono si scontra in concreto con i limiti persistenti degli attori umani.  
 
This paper aims at providing a response to the interrelated issues of electronification and 
digitization of payments combining a law, economics and humanities approach with a critical 
eye on the most recent evolution of European Union law on the matter of payment systems and 
complementary and digital currencies. To this objective, Part I investigates the concept of value 
in money exchanges through the conceptual relation in Mangan’s artwork between the ancient 
Yapese currency, rai, in the form of stone money, and the contemporary crypto-currency of 
bitcoins. Their juxtaposed story of production, consumption and circulation, as well as of re-
evaluation, will then be extended to the relation between localised/complementary, on the one 
side, and globalised/digital currencies, on the other side, to highlight how monetary value, 
originally “carved” via (closed) criteria of community belonging, changes when “sold” to an 
 
1  This is a blind-peer reviewed paper. Here, it is published a revised version of the 
conference essay originally presented at 5th Biennal RAMICS International Conference on 
Going Digital? New Possibilities of Digital-Community Currency Systems, Hida - Takayama, Japan as 
an outcome of Jean Monnet Chair in EU Money Law, with the support of the Erasmus Plus 
Programme. Indeed, Dr Gimigliano is the holder of Jean Monnet Chair in EU Money Law, 
while Dr Cattelan is one of the key teaching staff members of the same project. 
The paper is made up of two parts: Part I (sections 1 and 2) is authored by Dr Valentino 
Cattelan, while the Part II (sections 3 and 4) is authored by Dr Gabriella Gimigliano. By 
contrast, the introduction and the concluding remarks may be referred to both of them.  
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(open) market dominated by technology. Accordingly, Part II will later shed light over the 
regulatory approach to money and payments at the European level, focusing on the main 
features of the “regular” payment system and the bitcoin-like money systems, drawing the 
conclusions that the currency tokens based on permissionless blockchain can hardly change 
(and solve) issues of payment systems’ governance and credit crunch, as if their sustainability, 
and the new growth that they promise,  would be, in fact, subject to persistent and inescapable 
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1. Introduction: The Limits to Growth 
 
In 1972, around 50 years ago, governments met in Sweden for the UN 
Conference on the Human Environment, and in 1983 the UN created the 
World Commission on Environment and Development (also known as 
Brundtland Commission), with the definition of sustainable development 
as «meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
the future generations to meet their own needs». Also in 1972, a famous 
report entitled The Limits to Growth was issued by the so-called Club of 
Rome (composed of current and former heads of state, UN 
representatives and high-level government officials, business leaders...) 
with a computer simulation of the not-indefinite economic growth in 
presence of a finite supply of resources. 
More recently, the reduction of inequality appear among the persistent 
challenges that the 2030 Agenda of the United Nations has clearly 
indicated in 2015 in the famous list of its seventeen Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). 
Money has a central role in promoting the sustainability of the 
economic system. Therefore, the recent technical innovation applied to 
money, payments and settlement process, question us on the ability of 
overcoming the Limits to Growth and fill in the inequality gap, a problem 
which is currently affecting also the future development of the European 
Union   
This paper aims at facing this issue by combining a law and humanities 
approach with a critical eye on the most recent evolution of European 
Union law on the matter of the electronification of money, negotiability, 
payment systems and complementary and digital currencies. 
To this objective, Part I of the paper takes inspiration from the work 
by Australian artist Nicholas Mangan Limits to Growth (itself related to 
the 1972 Report) in order to explore the connection between law and 
economy from an inter- and trans-cultural perspective. In this light, Part 
I investigates the concept of value in money exchanges through the 
conceptual relation in Mangan’s artwork between the ancient Yapese 
currency, rai, in the form of stone money, and the contemporary crypto-
currency of bitcoins. Their juxtaposed story of production, consumption 
and circulation, as well as of re-evaluation, will then be extended to the 
relation between localised/complementary, on the one side, and 
globalised/digital currencies, on the other side, to highlight how 
monetary value, originally “carved” via (closed) criteria of community 
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belonging, changes when “sold” to an (open) market dominated by 
technology.  
Part II concerns the European normative framework for payments 
addressing the main features of a rai-like payment system; in other words, 
the payment system set out at European Union level and based on the 
electronification of fund transfers and the harmonisation process of 
technical and regulatory standards. When virtual currencies took to the 
big stage, the European policymaker took a wait-and-see approach, 
neither accommodating nor forbidding the newly-born money-like 
product within the institutional framework. But, apart from future 
regulatory actions, should we consider virtual currencies as a useful 
means of overcoming Limits to Growth?  
 
 
2. Part I - The sustainability of money: law, economics and the impact 
of technology 
 
Named after the Report mentioned above, Limits to Growth is the first 
survey exhibition by multidisciplinary Australian artist Nicholas Mangan 
(born 1979, AU) which took place at the KW Institute for Contemporary 
Art in Berlin from 2 June to 13 August 2017.  
The exhibition2 brought together five art projects that the artist 
developed over the last nine years on inter-connected themes such as the 
on-going impacts of colonialism, consumption cultures and the dynamics 
of global political economy. In particular, the exhibition itself lent its 
title from Mangan’s most recent artwork Limits to Growth (2016-2017), 
where he forges interdependence between two (apparently distant, but 
actually much closer one another than expected) monetary currencies: 
rai, the ancient large stone coins from the Micronesian island of Yap, and 





2 Accompanied by a volume published by Sternberg Press; see list of references: BURNS -
DAY - GRUIJTHUIJSEN - LUNDH, (eds), Nicholas Mangan: Limits to Growth, Berlin, 2016. 





Mangan, N., installation view Limits to Growth, KW Institute for Contemporary Art, 2017 
(photo by Frank Sperling, published online at http://www.kw-berlin.de/en/press/) 
 
The installation consumes “money” that is produced by a bitcoin mining 
ring installed in the Museum basement to pay for the production of large-
format photographs of rai stone coins, with an indexical relationship to the 
energy employed by the bitcoin mining taking place below, thus re-
formulating “value” from an exchange medium to the other. Photographs are 
also juxtaposed to an underwater video of a rai stone lying on the bottom of 
the Miil Channel off the northwest coast of Yap. The sound of a human 
breathing through a scuba apparatus is taken from the video, and mixes with 
that of the bitcoin miners and the noise of the building’s air-conditioning 
system. As Mangan underlines in his website presentation of the opus, all 
these sounds «allude to the presence of closed systems and the notion of the 
necessity of circulation in any currency». 





9 terrahash Bitcoin ASIC mining ring. Installation detail 
(picture taken from Mangan’s personal website) 
 
Limits to Growth gives form to a complex interaction between matter and 
energy by incorporating together «sculptural objects and environments, film, 
sound and evolving and contingent systems that act to generate and sustain his 
work through time»3. The opus becomes in this way a generative project that 
draws on materials and labour in order to explore the evolution of money 
value, as well as its cultural re-formulation in time and space.  
In actual fact, although rai were carved large stones and bitcoin, on the 
contrary, are virtual and in a sense immaterial, since minted by computers 
solving complex algorithms, both currencies share (as any currency) a 
 
3 CLARK, Artists at work: Nicholas Mangan, Available online at https://www.afterall.org/ 
online/artists-at-work-nicholas-mangan#.WZLBdGe3q_U 
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common story of production and consumption of monetary value within their 
own (closed) exchange system, overlapping with further layers of circulation 
and re-formulation of value when located in an (open) exchange environment, 




Mangan, N., installation view Limits to Growth, KW Institute for Contemporary Art, 2017 
(photo by Frank Sperling, published online at http://www.kw-berlin.de/en/press/) 
 
2.1 The Island of Stone Money: rai, bitcoins and how to produce and 
consume monetary value 
 
The story of rai (also called fei) stones is popular among economists, and 
has been mentioned by Keynes, Friedman, Tobin and Makiw4. The first source 
of the story dates back to 1910, with a book by physician and ethnographer 
William Henry Furness III, of which some excerpts were also reproduced in 
The Economic Journal (1915)5. 
 
4 As reported by GOLDBERG, Famous myths of “fiat money”, in Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 2005, vol. 37 (5), 957-967. 
5 FURNESS III, The island of stone money, in The Economic Journal, 1915, vol. 25, 281-283. 
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In 1903 Furness spent some months on the island of Uap (or Yap), part of 
the Caroline Islands, in the Pacific Ocean east of the Philippines. He was 
particularly impressed by the local monetary system, and accordingly gave his 
book the title The Island of Stone Money (1910). Local legend held that around 
six centuries before an expedition of Yapese fishermen landed accidentally 
250 miles away in one of the islands of Palau: they found there limestone 
rocks (inexistent in Yap) which looked very valuable to them. A first stone 
was then carved in the shape of a whale (rai in their native language), while 
others, later on, were made circular, since (probably) the  round shape was 
easier to transport (the original name of rai did not change). 
Being such a rare commodity, so difficult to quarry, carve and transport, 
the stones had a great value and soon became currency on Yap, following a 
similar process that gold had in the Mediterranean cultures of antiquity6. Their 
value, in actual fact, was not only material: rai was a currency that represented 
genuine labour, as it was mined and carved on Palau, carried hundreds of miles 
by outrigger canoes and 10-20 men were needed to move the largest ones (3-
4 meters in diameter) on Uap island. Along the time, the monetary value of a 
specific stone was linked not only to its size and the quality of craftsmanship, 
but also to its history, being more valuable if many people died during the 
transportation, or a famous sailor carried it to Yap. 
Next to these cultural-related factors of (1) production of the value of rai 
stones, also their (2) consumption process was deeply inserted in the (closed) 
exchange system of the Yapese society.7 Since the stones were usually too 
heavy to move and high was the risk of damage, their value passed from one 
person to another simply by agreeing that the ownership was changed (the 
physical location of the rai did not matter) and the transaction was recorded 
through the oral history of the community. In other terms, the consumption of 
rai stones did not require any physical circulation, but was based on a shared 
history of ownership, by means of its oral transmission in the closed social 
space of Yap island. The social recognition of the stones value was so strong 
that even when a large rai accidentally sank to the sea floor, and was never 
seen again, everyone agreed that it still existed and could be transacted as 
 
6 GIMÉNEZ, Bitcoins and the stone money, 2014. Available online at 
http://bitcoinsandeconomy. blogspot.de/2014/04/bitcoins-stone-money.html. 
7 For a brief anthropological depiction of the use of rai currency see: FITZPATRICK - 
PINKOWSKI, Banking on stone money, in Archeology, 2004, vol. 57 (2), 18 - 23. 
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genuine currency, even if not physically accessible to any party (while validly 




Chief Magistrate Anghel Gargog in costume wearing basket near two coral money discs, 1962 
(Photographer: Roy H. Goss. National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Instit., Washington, 
D.C.;picture taken from Mangan’s personal website) 
 
 
8 FURNESS III, The island of stone money, Uap of the Carolines, Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott 
Company, 1910, reports in his book what his faithful old friend, Fatumak, a local native, 
narrated to him, «that there was in the village near-by a family whose wealth was unquestioned, 
- acknowledged by every one - and yet no one, not even the family itself, had ever laid eye or 
hand on this wealth; it consisted of an enormous fei [i.e. rai], whereof the size is known only 
by tradition; for the past two or three generations it had been, and at that very time it was lying 
at the bottom of the sea! Many years ago an ancestor of this family, on an expedition after fei, 
secured this remarkably large and exceedingly valuable stone, which was placed on a raft to be 
towed homeward. A violent storm arose, and the party, to save their lives, were obliged to cut 
the raft adrift, and the stone sank out of sight. When they reached home, they all testified that 
the fei was of magnificent proportions and of extraordinary quality, and that it was lost through 
no fault of the owner. Thereupon it was universally conceded in their simple faith that the mere 
accident of its loss overboard was too trifling to mention, and that a few hundred feet of water 
off shore ought not to affect its marketable value, since it was all chipped out in proper form. 
The purchasing power of that stone remains, therefore, as valid as it were leaning visibly against 
the side of the owner’s house.» 





Mangan, Limits to Growth, 2016, video still (picture taken from 
http://www.the8thclimate.org/) 
 
Mangan’s artwork Limits to Growth makes visible the conceptual 
interdependence between rai and bitcoins as media of exchange where 
(physical) matter (i.e. stone) and (immaterial) energy (i.e. the electricity used 
to power the ASIC miners) produce monetary value, whose consumption 
transforms the latter into a representation of the former (in the installation the 
value of bitcoin is used to print indexed large photographs of rai stones), in a 
process of cultural translation that explores the interrelation between shared 
social norms (where a legal dimension is present) and the recognition of 
economic power within a given community (the Yapese community and the 
one of bitcoin users, hence the community of contemporary global markets). 
In addition to this, the story of rai stones explored by Mangan may give further 
insights into processes of cultural encounters in the form of  
(3) circulation and  
(4) (re-)formulation of (monetary) values (i.e. meaning). 
 
2.2 Yap money and the (new) world: two striking events of value 
circulation and re-evaluation in a cross-cultural context, and the role 
of foreign norms affecting closed social systems 
 
There are two remarkable events (apart from their unique way of 
production and consumption within the Yapese society) that belong to the 
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story of rai stones, and are highly significant for this research project, as 
inspired within the conceptual frame of Mangan’s Limits to Growth.  
Both events can be described as examples of cross-cultural (3) circulation 
and (4) re-formulation of value (i.e. re-evaluation) that occur when a closed 
exchange system enters into contact with others that are validated by different 
norms in an open exchange environment, affected either by the impact of new 
technology or the re-assertion of ‘local values’.   
(i) The first event (1871) witnessed a value re-formulation due to practices 
of extra-cultural circulation: “foreign norms” of value production replaced 
local ones, hence consuming the “value” (i.e. meaning) of “new” ray stones 
which were not recognized comparable to the “original” local ones.  
It was the forces of nature rather than self-determination that caused a 
collision between the new world and the self-contained Yapese culture. It was 
a typhoon, or so it’s said, that threw up a desolate and desperate Captain David 
O’Keefe onto the island of Yap in 1871. O’Keefe had taken to the seas to 
establish himself as a trader… [of copra, dried coconut meat, which was 
valuable export in the Far East], [but] his new world money had no exchange 
value within their stone currency. 
A baffled and frustrated O’Keefe departed Yap to Hong Kong on a passing 
steamer empty-handed only to return with a Chinese junk ship and a large 
supply of modern iron hand tools; if the Yapese wouldn’t accept his form of 
coinage then he would insert himself into the cycle of their own currency. 
However, O’Keefe was not “buying” or “selling” with the stones. Instead he 
facilitated an infrastructure introducing the wholesale trade in transporting 
Rai, which he rendered in exchange for marketable goods, such as copra.9 
The relative ease of excavation and shipping of “new” rai stones (produced 
through “foreign” norms, the iron tools) altered the economy of Yap, a form 
of inflation set in and consumed their value. Coming back to Limits of Growth, 
this is “an important concept that Bitcoins share with stone money of Yap: 
Bitcoins have a cap on the production of money to avoid inflation”10.  
(ii) The second event (1898), in reverse, occurred in the form of a re-
evaluation through intra-cultural circulation of Yap money: “locals norms” of 
consumption were applied to (re-) produce the value (i.e. meaning) of ray 
 
9 It should be mentioned here that in 1954 the adventure of Captain David O’Keefe on Yap 
island also became the subject of a film directed by Byron Haskin and starring Burt Lancaster, 
under the title His Majesty O’Keefe. MANGAN, Limits to Growths. Part 2 - Numismatics: A 
study of Dead and Dying Currencies and the True Value of Waste. Description of the 
installation project at KW museum, available at http://www.nicholasmangan.com/. 
10 GIMÉNEZ, op. cit. 
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stones to the advantage of “foreign actors.” The case, reported by Furness (1910), 
occurred when the German Government assumed the ownership of the Caroline 
Islands, after their purchase from Spain, and the new rulers decided to pave them, 
demanding the Yapese to repair their roads and put them in good order. But the 
roughly dressed blocks of coral were, however, quite good enough for the bare 
feet of the natives; and many were the repetitions of the command, which still 
remained unheeded. At last, by a happy thought, the fine was exacted by sending 
a man… throughout the disobedient districts, where he simply marked a certain 
number of the most valuable fei [i.e. rai] with a cross in black paint to show that 
the stones were claimed by the government. This instantly worked like a charm; 
the people, thus dolefully impoverished, turned to and repaired the highways to 
such good effect from one end of the island to the other, that they are now like 
park drives. Then the government dispatched its agents and erased the crosses. 
Presto! The fine was paid, and the happy… [people] resumed possession of their 




Mangan, N., Limits to Growth (2016/17), video still 
(Photograph: Roy H. Goss, National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institute, Washington, DC) 
 
One may comment on this case and the immediate reaction could be “How 
silly. How can be people so illogical?” Indeed, after raising this question in a 
paper having the same title of Furness’ book The Island of Stone Money, 
Milton Friedman turns to the understanding of (and the sympathy for) the 
“innocent people of Yap”12 by equating the monetary role of the stone money 
 
11  FURNESS, op.  cit. 
12 FRIEDMAN, The Island of Stone Money, Working Papers in Economics, E-91-3. Standford 
University: The Hoover Institution, 1991, 1- 5.  
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to the U.S. reserves of gold held in Fort Knox for foreign governments, when 
in 1932-33 the Bank of France feared that the U.S. would not stick to the gold 
standard and consequently asked the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
covert U.S. dollar assets that it had there into (material) gold. 
To avoid the necessity of shipping the gold across the ocean, it requested 
the Federal Reserve Bank simply to store the gold on the Bank of France’s 
account. In response, officials of the Federal Reserve Bank went to their gold 
vault, put in separate drawers the correct amount of gold ingots, and put a label 
or mark on those drawers indicating that they were the property of the French 
- for all it matters they could have done so by marking them “with a cross in 
black paint” just as the Germans did to the stones13. 
Friedman significantly concludes his paper with the following observations. 
The Yap Islanders regarded stones quarried and shaped on a distant island 
and brought to their own as the concrete manifestation of wealth. For a century 
and more, the “civilized” world regarded as a concrete manifestation of its 
wealth metal dug from deep in the ground, refined at great labor, and 
transported great distances to be buried again in elaborate vaults deep in the 
ground. Is the one practice really more rational than the other? 
What both examples - and numerous additional ones that could be listed - 
illustrate is how important “myth,” unquestioned belief, is in monetary 
matters. Our own money, the money we have grown up with, the system under 
which it is controlled, these appear “real” and “rational” to us. The money of 
other countries often seems to us like paper or worthless metal, even when the 
purchasing power of individual units is high14. 
 
 
3. Part II - The European framework for payments and the exogenous 
variable of virtual currencies 
 
From a normative standpoint, the European Union is fertile and interesting 
terrain for the experimental innovation of means of payment and settlement15. 
 
13 FRIEDMAN, The Island of Stone Money, Working Papers in Economics, cit., 3-4. 
14 FRIEDMAN, The Island of Stone Money, Working Papers in Economics, cit., 4-5. 
15 The European Union (EU) is an international organization, to whom the Member States 
have transferred elements of their sovereignty; it enjoys its own jurisdiction. It is actually based 
on the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union 
(TFEU), which establish the powers of the Union, its objectives, institutional organization, and 
the legislative process (namely which European institutions are involved and in what way). This 
means that the EU is also a community of law: the Union and its institutions are entitled to 
make laws or rules according to the principle of conferral, pursuant to Article 5.1 TEU, «the 
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Indeed, over time, the Union has set up a harmonising framework for 
payments with a view to building up an «area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaties» (art. 26.2, Treaty on 
Functioning of the European Union or TFEU), namely, an internal market for 
payments. The result has been the establishment of an EU-based payment 
system treated as a law-based infrastructure connecting all European payment 
service users, both consumers and traders, regardless of the currency used. 
However, the currency whose exchange may work as a discharging value are 
only fiat currencies, namely, the currency issued by nation-States or 
international organisations on their behalf. 
This payment system, examined in the following sections, is a centralised 
payment system, based on the intermediation of credit institutions and non-
banking financial institutions: it is first and foremost a cultural product and, 
for this reason, may be compared to the rai payment system used on Yap 
Island.  
As happened (or is said to have happened) on Yap island, any monetary 
system may operate for too long as a closed system: by chance or by design, 
technological development comes to challenge the existing payment system. 
Within the EU, the novelty is represented by virtual currencies, set up as a 
disintermediated payment system - namely, an infrastructure based on DLT-
technology - and a monetary value other than the fiat currencies, for example 
bitcoin. The EU is experiencing a cultural change, which may or may not 
prevail over the present payment system. In the end, the main point is whether 
virtual currencies can fill any gaps European payment service users suffer 
from. 
Part II is organised as follows: in the remaining paragraphs of section 3, 
the paper focuses on two main features of the European payment system, 
namely electronification (3.1.) and harmonisation (3.2.). In section 4, the 
paper turns to the European policy reaction to the spread of virtual currencies 
addressing the main policy and regulatory concerns. In the end, the virtual 
currencies seem to represent a last frontier of the electronification of retail 
payments, which may - to some extent - improve the financial inclusion 
process encouraged by the European policymaker, but they are short of 
convincing answers to the ambiguities of payment systems’ governance and 
credit crunch issues, arising from the competition experience as two leading 
bottlenecks of the payment services market. 
 
Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member 
States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein».  
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3.1. The “electronification” process  
 
The “electronification” of retail payments is seen as a policy tool for 
overcoming the fragmentation of the national market: indeed, it may facilitate 
cross-border payments and commercial transactions in general, where 
commercial transactions may concern goods, services or capital. 
The EU-based legal framework for the “electronification” of payments, 
adhering to the policy priorities set out at the international level since the second 
half of the 80s, has promoted a continuous, efficient, and safe flow of information, 
where this flow (regarding the sum of money) amounts to a payment transaction 
or, from the provider’s standpoint, as a payment service. Where does the 
information flow to? In a payment system or in mutually interoperable payment 
systems, where the payment system is a contract-based network it is defined as a 
«funds transfer system with formal and standardised arrangements and common 
rules for the processing, clearing and/or settlement of payment transactions» (art. 
7, n. 4, PSD2)16.  
Towards the beginning of 2000, within - and beyond - the Eurozone17, the 
Union has been developing a regulatory process in readiness for the 
“electronification” of payments, being the «migration towards the provision 
of payment services on a fully electronic and highly automated basis» with a 
view to use the information and telecommunication technology to make the 
entire payment process fully automated, since the inception, when the 
payment order is issued (European Central Bank, 2003).  
In the past, the electronification process was always characterised by a 
neutrality approach. The principle of technical neutrality, applied to the 
European legal framework for money and payments since the beginning, has 
made no clear-cut choice on the way card payments, direct debits or credit 
transfer operations are operated. In fact, no harmonising rule has laid down 
technical standards. In contrast, the main policy concern was not to set out 
rules stifling the technical innovation progress, thus bettering the level of 
efficiency. However, this is clearly set out in the 2015 Payment Service 
Directive: the preamble (21) of which states that the “definition of payment 
 
16 Therefore, each payment system consists of a matchmaker providing the common technical 
and regulatory standards, enabling the payment service providers to communicate with each other, 
and there are often settlement services and payment service providers providing the payment 
services. At the base of this payment network are the payment service users, debtors and creditors. 
17 The countries of the European Union sharing the same currency - the euro - form the 
Eurozone, but the Eurozone does not represent an international organization as the European 
Union does.  
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services should be technologically neutral and should allow for the 
development of new types of payment services, while ensuring equivalent 
operating conditions for both existing and new payment service providers”. 
 
3.2. The harmonisation process and the level playing field 
 
The “electronification” of payments, mentioned above, is rooted in and 
supported by a broad EU-based normative framework, applying to all the 
countries in the Union and is mostly based on a full harmonisation approach18, 
covering payment service providers and conditions for access to the relevant 
market, as well as the payment service contract and alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms, (payment) data protection rules, etc. Anything not 
“digital” falls beyond the future of payment within the European Union, 
despite still belonging to the civil law tradition and practice of several EU 
countries. Indeed, since the 2007 Payment Service Directive (and still today 
with the 2015 Payment Service Directive that has replaced the former one), 
the “regulated field” has not covered all paper cheques, governed by the 1931 
Geneva Convention and any comparable paper-based commercial 
instruments, including all bills of exchange, promissory notes and other such 
instruments falling within merchant law that cannot be fully digitalized (i.e., 
from the beginning, when the payment order is issued to the end, when the 
payment order is settled).   
Generally speaking, the harmonisation process covers both negative and 
positive harmonisation and aims to remove the legal obstacles to the proper 
functioning of the internal market. In turn, the internal market has been 
involved since the Spark Plan came into being as the main regulatory and 
economic device for European growth. Indeed the common market is 
 
18 However, harmonisation varies in degree according to the allocation of jurisdiction 
between the Member States and the Union itself. The European Union does not always enjoy 
exclusive regulatory authority, depending on the area concerned: the construction of an internal 
market for payments is one of the regulatory powers shared between the Union and the Member 
States. Therefore, the Union has the power to undertake initiatives (e.g., drafting a directive or 
regulation) provided this initiative complies with two leading principles, namely the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality.  
The principle of subsidiarity provides that «in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and 
local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level» (art. 5. 3 TEU); in turn, the principle of proportionality establishes 
that «the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaties» (art. 5.4 TEU).   
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described in the plan in the following terms: «The objective of a common 
European market must be to create a vast zone of common economic policy, 
constituting a powerful unit of production, and making possible continuous 
growth, an increase in stability, and accelerated raising of the standard of 
living and the development of harmonious relations between the States which 
it unites»19. In other words, the harmonisation process is instrumental to the 
proper functioning of the internal/common market, which, in turn, is deemed 
to be the driving force of growth, so, for transitive property, harmonisation 
turns out to be necessary to trigger growth. 
However, the market for payment services in Europe stands as a natural 
oligopolistic market, highly fragmented along its national borders. For this 
reason, the European harmonisation process has tried to build up an internal 
market, trading off the competitiveness and contendibility of the product 
market on the one hand and financial inclusion on the other20. 
While subparagraphs 3.2.1., 3.2.2. and 3.2.3, focus on how the 
harmonisation process has tried to smooth the path for a more contendible 
market, 3.2.4. addresses the second axis of the harmonisation process, namely, 
the priority of financial inclusion policy. 
 
 
19  Mortelmans argues that there is no material distinction between the concept of internal 
market, common market and single market. MORTELMANS, The common market, the internal 
market and the single market, in Common Market Law Review, 1998 (35), 101 - 136. 
20 The positive harmonisation proess is predicated on regulatory action taken at Union level. 
In the area of payment transactions, it involves the European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council, as well as one or more of the European Supervisory Authorities. It 
is consists of non-binding (or soft) rules and compulsory legislation (such as directives and 
regulations) and ultimately complies with the principle of neutrality in relation to technological 
business models. 
The process of harmonising the electronification of payments began early, around the turn 
of the 80s, with the Commission issuing communications and recommendations on electronic 
payments and electronic money, setting out non-binding rules. The process continued in the 
second half of the 90s, establishing hard law rules through directives and regulations.  
There was an initial normative phase in which the Union mostly approved directives to 
achieve a minimum level of harmonisation: this meant that individual EU countries had great 
leeway in the transposition of directives within their national legal systems, as the European 
directives set a bare minimum level of regulation, leaving national governments free to enforce 
tougher rules. Later on, in the second phase, the Union progressed from a minimum 
harmonization to a full harmonisation approach, approving directives leaving small or no room 
for movement to the Member States in the implementation process, in addition to approving 
European regulations, which are per se directly applicable in the Member States. An overview 
in GIMIGLIANO, The lights and shadows of the EU law on payment transactions, in GIMIGLIANO, 
G. (ed), Money, Payment systems and the European Union. The regulatory challenges of 
governance, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 2016, 24 - 38.   
VALENTINO CATTELAN, GABRIELLA GIMIGLIANO 
26 
 
3.2.1. Transparency rules for payment service contracts 
 
Since the first Commission’s recommendations21, the European 
policymaker has focused on transparency as a legal device for improving 
competition among the payment service providers established in the 
Union.  
The transparency rules have always covered both regulatory and 
economic contracting conditions. Indeed, the European policymaker 
assumes that, by giving the payment service users proper information, they 
will be able to make well-informed commercial choices by cherry picking, 
in the internal market, the payment service provider or the payment service 
contract best suited to their needs. This may indirectly improve 
competition not only at national level but also at EU level.  
Since the first soft rules, the transparency rules cover the whole 
electronification process for payments. In fact, in the 80s, the Commission 
focused on electronic payment instruments, both e-money and account-
based products, providing for duties of information before and after a 
contract is made, in addition to a set of uniform terms and conditions to be 
set in line with the preliminary information given. When PSD1 was 
approved in 2007, the transparency rules exhibited slight normative 
differences compared with the corresponding soft rules, and so did the 
2015 Payment Service Directive22.  
 
21 See, among others: Commission Recommendation of 8 December 1987, OJEC n. L 
365/72 of 24.12.1987, on a European Code of Conduct relating to electronic payment; 
Commission Recommendation of 17 November 1988, OJEC n. L 317/55, of 24.11. 1988, 
concerning payment systems, and in particular the relationship between card-holder and card 
issuer.  
22 Drawing a rough comparison between the soft harmonising rules and the 2007 Payment 
Service Directive, the main regulatory difference lies in the information to it is necessary to 
“provide” and the information to be “made available” by the payment service provider. This 
distinction is clearly stated in the preamble (27) aiming to reaching a trade-off between cost-
efficiency and practical aspects of the payment service contracts, on the one side, and the needs 
of the payment service users, on the other. Indeed, concerning framework contracts, like 
payment account contracts, the information provided means the information «actively 
communicated by the payment service provider at the appropriate time as required by this 
Directive without further prompting by the payment service user, or the information should be 
made available to the payment service user, taking into account any request he may have for 
further information»; by contrast, the information is made available when «the payment service 
user should take some active steps in order to obtain the information, such as requesting it 
explicitly from the payment service provider», for example, logging into bank account mail box 
or inserting a card into printer for account statements. With regard to this regulatory approach, 
there is no change in the 2015 Payment Service Directive, which has set out tailor-made 
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Despite regulatory continuity, the 2014 Payment Accounts Directive 
addressed the matter of the internal market for payments being still highly 
fragmented along the national borders. More specifically, the transparency 
rules covered both normative and economic conditions but were lacking a 
uniform nomenclature of contract fees. Indeed, the banking industry had 
failed to reach an agreement on the standardisation of payment-service fee 
terminology, and this ended up discouraging the payment service 
consumers from cherry picking among the Member States, as the European 
policymaker had always wished23.  
The Payment Account Directive has consistently set out a bottom-up 
standardisation process starting from the Member States and going up to 
the European Banking Authority, with a view to provide the consumers 
with uniform statements of fee and payment account information 
documents, both featured by the «same format, order of items and 
headings»24 throughout the Member States.  
 
3.2.2. Non-bank payment service providers 
 
The harmonisation process has tried to level the playing field for 
payment service providers. Indeed, it has established the professional 
provision of payment services as a regulated business and has set up a close 
list of payment service providers. In addition to post offices, the list 
includes credit institutions, payment institutions (PIs) and electronic 
money institutions (EMIs) as non-bank payment service providers, 
respectively, specialised in the provision of payment services and in the 
issuance of e-money in compliance with the 2009 E-Money directive and, 
possibly also authorised to operate payment services25.  
Like the credit institutions and investment firms, the PIs and the EMIs 
may enjoy the freedom of establishment and the freedom of services in 
 
transparency rules for the newly-established payment services, namely, the account information 
services and the payment initiation services.  
23 See, preamble (5) ff., dir. 2014/92/EU, OJEU n. L 257/214, of 28.8.2014.  
24 See, preamble (20), dir. 2014/92/EU, OJEU n. L 257/214, of 28.8.2014. In addition, the 
2014 Payment Accounts Directive has compelled the Member States to set free-of-charge 
comparison websites in order to provide consumers with clear, concise and impartial 
information on payment service fees. Please, compare the preambles (22) and (23) as well as 
art. 7, 2014 Payment Accounts Directive. 
25 Besides, the close list of payment service providers comprises also the European Central 
Bank and the national central banks as well as the States, the regional and local authorities, 
«when not acting in their capacity as public authorities».   
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compliance with the principle of the single licence and home country 
control. To this end, the European framework provides for lighter financial 
requirements for payment institutions, strictly linked to a risk-based 
approach. In other words, own funds and initial capital requirements are 
established on the basis of the level of risk being run by the payment 
service(s) that has to be covered by the authorisation26. 
With a view to encouraging business operators to enter the market for 
payment services, the PSDs27 have drawn the distinction between pure and 
hybrid payment institutions. Indeed, the main concern was to prompt 
business entities, like fintech firms, big retailers, or Internet service 
providers, to enter the payments market: these entities operate outside the 
financial market but may possess the critical mass or the technical skills to 
provide electronic payment services. To the extent that they are authorised 
as hybrid payment institutions, they may operate alongside commercial 
and financial businesses directly without establishing a subsidiary. 
The ʻpayment service value chainʼ was ‘opened up’ with the 2015 
Payment Service Directive, in order to encourage competition in the field 
of payment systems. Indeed, while the 2007 directive allowed payment 
service providers to outsource some of the steps in payment transaction 
processing, the 2015 directive has permitted payment service users to share 
their data - the data associated with payment transactions - with payment 
service providers other than those operating their payment account, 
servicing the account information service providers and payment initiation 
service providers. They respectively provide for «an online service to 
provide consolidated information on one or more payment accounts held 
by the payment service user with either another payment service provider 
or with more than one payment service provider” (the account information 
service) and a “service to initiate a payment order at the request of the 
payment service user with respect to a payment account held at another 
payment service provider» (the payment initiation service). From the 
entrepreneurs’ standpoint, both of them are treated as regulated business 
activities that allow payment service providers other than payment account 
service providers to hold users’ data without stipulating a contract with the 
payment account servicing provider concerned. It is sufficient for the 
payment service user to enter into a contract with them. 
 
 
26 Title II, 2007 and 2015 Payment Service Directives.  
27 PSDs is the acronym covering both the 2007 Payment Service Directive and the 2015 
Payment Service Directive.  
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3.2.3. Interoperable and compatible payment systems 
 
To the extent that the electronification process has transformed payment into 
a flow of digital data, payment transactions may be more efficiently carried out 
via compatible and interoperable payment systems, where a “payment system” 
is a contract-based business organisation acting as the matchmaker between the 
two sides of the market (i.e., the payment service providers of the payer and of 
the payee), whose main scope is matching, processing and settling payment 
orders. More specifically, in the 2007 Payment Service Directive, the payment 
system is treated as a «funds transfer system with formal and standardised 
arrangements and common rules for the processing, clearing and/or settlement 
of payment transactions» (art. 4, n. 6) 28.  
For the European policymaker, the main point was retail payments. In fact, 
in the internal market, making a series of bilateral agreements between 
payment service providers would have made the cross-border transfer of funds 
extremely expensive. It was therefore important that payment could flow 
easily – as a string of data – through the payment systems (or the payment 
platforms). This is why, since the mid-80s Commission recommendations, the 
European policymaker has pushed forward the idea of compatible and 
interoperable payment systems that can easily communicate with each other.  
However, while the policy priority of the European policymaker was to 
remove all the legal, economic, and technical burdens on the proper 
functioning of the internal market for payments, the payment systems as 
business organisations (or associations of undertakings) claim that, due to the 
two-sided market structure and the positive network externalities exhibited by 
the payment services, they may operate as long as a vertical integration 
process is brought about, where the integration process goes from the top (the 
matchmaker) to the end-users (the payees and the payers) and implies a cost-
allocation mechanism among the network participants. The first group is 
subject to the “non-discrimination”29 rule as well as the “honour all cards”30 
 
28 This definition appears to be consistent with both the definition of payment system set 
out in the 1998 Settlement Finality Directive and in the 2015 Payment Service Directive. 
29 The “non-discrimination rule” prohibits merchants from adding charges to cardholders 
who pay using one of the methods provided by the payment system-platform. In addition, the 
no-discrimination rule prohibits merchants from giving consumers discounts for paying by 
other means of payment, such as cash, for example. See: Commission decision of 9th August 
2001, OJEC n. L293/24 of 10.11.2001.    
30 The “honour-all-cards” rule is a «twofold obligation imposed by issuers and payment 
card schemes for payees to accept all the cards of the same brand, irrespective of the different 
costs of these cards (the ‘Honour all Products’ element) and irrespective of the individual 
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rule; by contrast, the intra-system competition is deeply influenced by 
multilateral interchange fee31, the exclusionary clauses as membership fees32.  
Between the European policymaker and the market actors (i.e., the payment 
systems) there is the antitrust action, carried on by the network of national 
antitrust authorities, led by the Commission as primus inter pares, firstly 
according to Commission Regulation n. 17 of 1965 and, later on, Commission 
Regulation n. 1 of 2003.  
In the market for payment services, the antitrust regulatory experience goes 
back to the 1995 Commission communication on the application of 
competition rules to cross-border credit transfers and has been based, 
throughout the years, on the Commission’s decisions and European courts’ 
rulings, like Visa, Mastercard or Cartes Bancaires case law, just to mention a 
few. An in-depth analysis of antitrust results falls beyond the scope of this 
paper, but, to cut a long story short, the European lawmaker has decided to 
step into the antitrust arena, making some regulatory choices taking legislative 
initiatives: 
- With regard to access to the payment systems, it has been established that 
«Member States shall ensure that the rules on access of authorised or 
registered payment service providers that are legal persons to payment 
systems are objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate and that they 
do not inhibit access more than is necessary to safeguard against specific 
risks such as settlement risk, operational risk and business risk and to 
protect the financial and operational stability of the payment system. 
Payment systems shall not impose on payment service providers, on 
payment service users or on other payment systems any of the following 
requirements: (a) restrictive rule on effective participation in other 
payment systems; (b) rule which discriminates between authorised 
payment service providers or between registered payment service 
providers in relation to the rights, obligations and entitlements of 
participants; (c) restriction on the basis of institutional status» (art. 35, 
2015 Payment Service Directive);  
 
issuing bank which has issued the card (the ‘Honour all Issuers’ element)» (Preamble 37, Reg. 
751/2015/EU).  
31 The “multilateral interchange fee” means a «fee paid for each transaction directly or 
indirectly (i.e. through a third party) between the issuer and the acquirer involved in a card-
based payment transaction. The net compensation or other agreed remuneration is considered 
to be part of the interchange fee» (art. 2, n. 10, Reg. 751/2015/EU). 
32 The exclusionary clauses may influence intra-system competition; in other words, 
competition among incumbents and newcomers based on membership fees and the qualities of 
the payment services provided by the payment system(s) concerned. 
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- Concerning multilateral interchange fees, Regulation 751/2015/EU 
provides that all debit and credit card-based payments are subject to a 
maximum interchange fee rate, which may be lowered for domestic 
payments; 
- As for the “honour all cards” rule, Regulation 751/2015/EU has established 
that «Payment card schemes and payment service providers shall not apply 
any rule that obliges payees accepting a cardbased payment instrument 
issued by one issuer also to accept other card-based payment instruments 
issued within the framework of the same payment card scheme»; 
- In the end, art. 62 of the 2015 Payment Service Directive (formerly art. 52, 
2007 Payment Service Directive) concerning the non-discrimination rule, 
has established that, generally speaking, the «payment service provider 
shall not prevent the payee from requesting from the payer a charge, 
offering him a reduction or otherwise steering him towards the use of a 
given payment instrument».  
Apart from any further consideration, one might reasonably assume that 
the European policymaker has taken the regulatory initiative in this field 
because the antitrust experience was raising some degree of legal uncertainty, 
but the result is still highly debated. In the end, both European legislation and 
antitrust experience have addressed the payment system as the conceptual 
device for the construction of the European framework for payments. 
 
3.2.4. Harmonisation and financial inclusion 
 
The second axis of the European harmonisation process for payments is 
financial inclusion. At the beginning, this meant allowing payment service 
users to enjoy the full benefits of the internal market for goods, services and 
persons. More recently, however, this has become the right to access the 
payment system on a non-discriminatory basis, holding at least a payment 
account with basic features.  
The first step was taken in the late 70s and mid-80s, when the 
harmonisation process was exclusively based on the Treaty’s negative 
provisions and led by the preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice33.  
 
33 We can draw a distinction between positive and negative harmonization processes. 
Positive harmonization broadly aligns the rules and regulations of the various members of the 
Union, providing common Community-based rules, so they are established through the ordinary 
legislation process (art. 114 TFEU). On the other hand, the negative harmonization process is 
grounded on the proceedings of the European Court of Justice, which is also responsible for 
ascertaining whether national administrative or legislative provisions comply with the 
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At that time, the free movement of payments was still considered ancillary 
to the free movement of capital and, in turn, the latter had not yet been fully 
liberalised. Within this normative context, the joint “Luisi and Carbone”34 
cases posed the following situation: two nationals of a Member State (Italy) 
moved to another Member State to enjoy tourist services or medical treatments 
and brought with them a quantity of physical banknotes in the foreign currency 
for use abroad, exceeding the maximum permitted by the home exchange law. 
Both Mrs Luisi and Mr Carbone were charged under national law, which 
imposed a penalty on them.  
The Court of Justice, asked to release a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation of art. 106 of the Treaty of Rome, held that «(…) any payments 
connected with the movement of goods or services are to be liberalised to the 
extent to which the movement of goods and services has been liberalised 
between the Member States”, in other words, the money consideration paid for 
exchanging goods or services (the so-called current payments) had been fully 
liberalised since the end of the transitional period. In addition, the Court held 
that the «physical transfer of bank notes may not therefore be classified as a 
movement of capital where the transfer in question corresponds to an 
obligation to pay arising from a transaction involving the movement of goods 
or services. Consequently, payments in connection with tourism or travel for 
the purposes of business, education or medical treatment cannot be classified 
as movements of capital, even where they are affected by means of physical 
transfer of bank notes»35. 
After the Maastricht Treaty, the free movement of capital and payments 
was fully liberalised, and the latter was no longer considered as ancillary to 
the former. It was in these years, as I have already outlined in the paragraphs 
above, that the ongoing positive harmonisation process began. However, 
financial inclusion has only recently become a clear-cut policy priority. In 
fact, the 2014 Payment Accounts Directive clearly established the non-
discrimination principle, providing that «Member States shall ensure that 
credit institutions do not discriminate against consumers legally resident in 
the Union by reason of their nationality or place of residence or by reason of 
any other ground as referred to in Article 21 of the Charter, when those 
 
European Treaty rules or, conversely, may hinder fulfillment of the principles of the European 
Treaties, especially the free movement of persons, goods, services, capital and payments. On 
the legal techniques of harmonisation, see: KURCZ, Harmonisation by means of directives-a 
never-ending story?, in European Business Law Review, 2001 (Nove. Dec), 287 - 307.  
34 Joined cases 286/82 and 26/83. 
35 Luisi and Carbone joined case, § 21 - 23.  
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consumers apply for or access a payment account within the Union. The 
conditions applicable to holding a payment account with basic features shall 
be in no way discriminatory»36. They are entitled to hold a payment account 
or, at least a payment account with basic features: indeed, the 2014 Payment 
Accounts Directive establishes that this type of payment account is provided 
by a number of credit institutions in each Member State for European 
consumers, microenterprises and asylum seekers, «irrespective of the 
consumers’ financial circumstances, such as their employment status, level of 
income, credit history or personal bankruptcy»37. In addition, the holders of 
payment accounts with basic features may place, withdraw, and transfer funds 
by means of direct debits, credit transfers and card payments. In this sense, 
they are fully comparable to regular payment accounts38. 
Consistently with the financial inclusion policy priority, the 2018 
Geoblocking Regulation «seeks to address direct, as well as indirect 
discrimination. Thus, it also seeks to cover unjustified differences of treatment 
on the basis of other distinguishing criteria which lead to the same result as 
the application of criteria directly based on customers' nationality or place of 
residence, regardless of whether the customer concerned is present, 




4. Digital Currencies as a new monetary system 
 
The analysis of the legislation provided in the preceding sections has 
shown the main regulatory features of the European payment system as a 
whole, addressing how the electronification process of funds transfer has led 
the regulatory harmonisation process at European level.  
In the end, a European payment system has been established, firmly rooted 
in common regulatory, technical and information standards, based on the role 
of the middleman performed by payment service providers, clearing houses, 
central banks and, above all, payment system-platforms. In fact, the single 
payment system-platform has become a conceptual, technical and normative 
unit. 
 
36  Art. 15, 2014 Payment Accounts Directive. 
37 Preamble (35), 2014 Payment Accounts Directive.  
38 See: art. 17, 2014 Payment Accounts Directive.   
39 Preamble (6), Reg. 2018/302/EU, OJEU n. 60/I, of 2.3.2018.  
VALENTINO CATTELAN, GABRIELLA GIMIGLIANO 
34 
 
However, sooner or later, the European payment system was to encounter 
something completely new, as happened with the ancient rai-based system. 
This is the case of the virtual currencies (VCs) system and, among these, 
bitcoins as a leading virtual currency scheme.  
Generally speaking, virtual currencies work as a payment system, in other 
words, as a value transfer system where the flow of monetary assets is 
denominated in a private currency, the bitcoin, acting as a unit of account.  
The bitcoin is based on the blockchain system, which works as «a protocol 
for sending, receiving and recording value on a public ledger», featured by 
immutability or «resistance to tamper», because its state is externally 
verifiable and all data is immutable40. As a «value container»41, the blockchain 
may contain a fiat currency, a privately-issued currency, a financial 
instrument, and other assets. Indeed, there might be a blockchain without a 
monetary token, but there is no virtual currency without blockchain 
technology. 
Bitcoins are the prototype of bi-directional (i), permissionless (ii) and 
decentralised (iii) virtual currency schemes, gaining momentum since the 
2009-2011 financial crisis as a form of reaction to the official financial system. 
Indeed, they respectively: (i) enjoy a close link between the virtual world and 
the real economy, and this may actually influence the monetary function of 
fiat currencies and the role of central banks, as well as the efficiency and 
affordability of the “regular” payment system42; (ii) allow anyone to 
participate in the process of determining what blocks are added to the chain, 
for which reason they are also treated as public ledgers43; and lastly, (iii) the 
current state of the chain and the bitcoin platform allows all the nodes (i.e., all 
participants) to take part in the validation process of the bitcoin blockchain, 
with all of them having a copy of all the transactions ever made44. Of the three 
features of the bitcoin-blockchain, decentralisation is without doubt the most 
 
40 PILKINGTON, Blockchain technology: principles and applications, in OLLEROS - ZHEGU 
(eds), Research handbook on digital transformation, Cheltenham, UK, 2016.    
41  PILKINGTON, op. cit. 
42 An overview of the different types of virtual schemes, please, check: ECB, Virtual 
currency schemes, Frankfurt am Main, October 2012. 
43 Sometimes it is drawn the difference between private and public ledgers, some others 
between permissioned and permissionless ledgers, but in the end they are respectively 
comparable one with the others. See: PILKINGTON, Blockchain technology: principles and 
applications, op. cit. 
44 PILKINGTON, op. cit.; BARON - O’MAHONY - MANHEIN - DION-SCHWARZ, Examining the 
potential for non-state actor development, 2015, Rand Corporation Report, 5-21, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.72249/j.ctt19rmd78.8   
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challenging because it is argued that it is the level of decentralisation that 
makes the difference compared with the “traditional” payment systems, 
making reference either to the property title regarding the physical and virtual 
nodes or to the lack of coordination among the actions of the different actors 
that, in turn, have different internal roles in the validation process of the 
bitcoin transfers45. 
A brief comparison between the regular payment system and bitcoin block-
chain value transfer (sub 4.1.) may help us figure out which type of regulatory 
changes should be made and whether the latter would prevail over the former 
(sub 4.2. and 4.3.). 
 
4.1. The regular payment system vs the bitcoin value transfer system 
 
In regular payment systems, commercial banks are committed to 
ascertaining whether the payer is entitled to transfer the sum of money 
concerned, while here the “multispending problem” is dealt with via a 
cryptographic method, namely, «by a mathematical proof that the payer is the 
effective owner of that unit of money»46. This mechanism works through a 
digital signature and a complex validation process. According to the former 
element, each participant uses a double key, namely a private and public key, 
transmitting the public key to the network, but keeping the private key secret, 
which in turn makes it possible to couple the owner to the amount of money 
transferred. As stated in the economics literature, this mechanism is « 
conceptually similar to having an address with a locked mailbox; anyone can 
deliver mail, but only someone can take letters out and send them to a new 
address, thereby transferring or spending them»47. Conversely, the latter 
element - namely, the validation process - is carried out through a 
decentralised consensus protocol or blockchain, i.e., a «chain of transactional 
records that a subset of network participants (also known as miners) enriches 
by solving difficult computational problems»48. While the consensus concerns 
 
45 PILKINGTON, op. cit.; WALCH, Deconstructing “Decentalization”. Exploring the core 
claim of crypto systems, in BRUMMER, Cryptoassets. Legal, Regulatory, and monetary 
perspectives, Oxford: OUP, 2019, 39 - 68.  
46  PILKINGTON, op. cit. 
47 BARON - O’MAHONY - MANHEIN - DION-SCHWARZ, Examining the potential for non-state 
actor development, 12 ff. 
48 PILKINGTON, op. cit.    
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whether or not to include the new block in the blockchain49, miners, natural 
or legal persons, are the nodes of the network, and they «fiercely (and 
anonymously) compete on the network to solve the mathematical problem in 
the most efficient way, thereby adding the next block to the blockchain»50.  
Bitcoin-like virtual currency schemes use a bottom-up and decentralised 
validation process giving a different content to the payment finality process. 
Whereas in the regular payment system the transfer of funds is carried out by 
the commercial banks and the clearing and settlement houses, all the 
participants in the virtual currency network may (in theory) become validators 
and, as such, not only may they take an active role in the monetary exchange 
process, but they also participate in the money issuance process, replacing the 
traditional functions of the central banks and the private banking system. In 
fact, it has been emphasised that the validation process is closely linked to the 
issuance process: the first node solving the mathematical problem is rewarded 
by new bitcoins automatically generated by the system. In turn, users reward 
the validators on a voluntary basis when the validation process is carried out51. 
There are a couple of further trust-based issues to address, drawing a 
comparison between the regular European payment system and the VC-value 
transfer system.  
Payment service users must rely on the proper execution of their payment 
orders as well as the protection of their funds and data. The national and 
European authorities, together with the central banks, are in charge of 
performing financial supervision and oversight functions in order to preserve 
trust in the stability of payment service providers and the affordable and 
efficient functioning of the payment system as a whole.  
On the other hand, as the regular payment system has been replaced by the 
VC-system, there is no issue of trust in the financial intermediaries and the 
financial authorities. Indeed, thanks to the hash function, the blockchain is 
always characterised by immutability, which is «what confers its intrinsic 
value to crypto-currencies, thanks to a revolutionary feature, namely ‘the 
ability to declare a truth, globally and without a centre of authority, regardless 
of what anyone else does to change this truth’»52. In fact, the hash is an output, 
 
49 More details in: BONAIUTI, Economic issues on m-payments and bitcoin, in Gimigliano 
(ed), Bitcoin and mobile payments. constructing a European Union Framework, Palgrave 
Studies in Financial Services Technology, London, 2016, 27 - 51.   
50  PILKINGTON, op. cit.   
51 Bonaiuti argued that «even if this fee is completely on a voluntary basis, probably 
transactions without fees are never validated». See: BONAIUTI, Economic issues on m-payments 
and bitcoin, 41.   
52 PILKINGTON, op. cit.   
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namely the result of a transformation of the original information (input): «each 
block contains a list of transactions, as well as the hash, or digital signature, 
of the previous block created (hence the term block chain) for the ledger, since 
each block is chained to the previous one»53. Hence, it is assumed that the 
validation process cannot be reversed54.  
In the end, the bitcoin system (and virtual currencies alike) raises a further 
issue of trust, namely, trust in the stability of its purchasing power.  
In the regular payment system, the central banks are committed to 
preserving monetary stability by implementing monetary policy. Indeed, the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishes that the «primary 
objective of the European System of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as 
‘the ESCB’) shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the 
objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic 
policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the 
objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European 
Union» (art. 127). 
By contrast, virtual currency schemes like bitcoins enjoy market-based 
value, and this greatly impairs their function as a reserve of value. In order to 
make the virtual currencies less volatile, financial service providers and 
technology companies are working on stablecoins, using the following 
stabilisation mechanism: they ensure the value of the virtual assets by either 
«(i) holding money (in one currency or a basket of different currencies), (ii) 
securities and commodities such as gold, (iii) crypto-assets or even (v) user’s 
expectations about future purchasing power»55.  
Only the coming years may tell us whether the VC-based value transfer 
system might totally or partially replace the regular European payment 
system. Anyway, what will happen in the future is likely to be influenced by 
the on-going policy-making choice. Firstly, it might be influenced by the 
regulatory reaction of the European institutions, and - secondly - it might be 
led by its aptitude for coping with existing regulatory drawbacks or market 
bottlenecks.  
In the following sections, this paper first gives an overview of European 
regulatory reactions with a view to ascertaining whether the European 
policymaker has prohibited, regulated or ignored, the new monetary 
phenomenon (sub 4.2.): it is worthy of note that on Yap Island, the Germans 
 
53 BARON - O’MAHONY - MANHEIN - DION-SCHWARZ, Examining the potential for non-state 
actor development, cit., 12 
54 PILKINGTON, op. cit.   
55 ECB, Stablecoins - no coins, but are they stable?, In Focus, Issue n. 3, November 2019.  
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tried to prevent Yap inhabitants from using rai by drawing a cross on the 
largest stones. In turn, in 4.3., this paper wonders whether the VC-value 
transfer system can cope with some of the most prominent regulatory 
drawbacks of the current payment system. 
 
4.2. The European policymaker’s reaction to the spread of virtual 
currencies 
 
As explained in Part I of this paper, the German government tried to control 
the disobedient districts on Yap Island by sending a man in charge of marking 
a certain number of the most valuable rai with a black cross. Learning from 
the e-money regulatory experience, the European policymaker has decided to 
take a wait-and-see approach to bitcoin-like virtual currency schemes. Indeed, 
although they might jeopardise the monetary function of the central bank as 
well as the role of fiat currency as a unit of account, this time, the ECB 
acknowledges that virtual currencies still represent a tiny share of the 
market56.  
Generally speaking, there are two main strands of regulatory reaction at 
European level; these handle threats to the regular operation of the financial 
system and contract freedom in the payee-payer obligation relationship.  
With a view to protecting the soundness of the financial system, the 2018 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive57 focuses on the money-laundering risk 
raised by the anonymity of bitcoin-like virtual currencies. Indeed, the main 
point concerns the anonymity of virtual currency schemes like bitcoins, where 
there is no way of coupling the public key with the private one. This may make 
them a useful device for money laundering activities. Therefore, both the 
providers professionally engaged in the exchange services between virtual 
currencies and fiat currencies as well as the custodian wallet providers58 must 
be registered and fulfil the notification requirements laid down in the 2015 
AML directive59.   
 
56 ECB, Virtual currency schemes - a further analysis, Frankfurt am Main, 2015, 32 f.  
57 Directive 2018/843/EU of 30 May 2018, published in OJEU n. L 156/43 of 19.6.2018. 
58 With regard to the business of custodian wallet providers, please, see: BONAIUTI, 
Economic issues on m-payments and bitcoin, 38 f. It goes without saying that the VC ecosystem 
is much broader. 
59  It is worthy of note that the 2018 AML directive provides a definition of virtual currency 
- for the first time in the European legal framework - considering it as a «digital representation 
of value that is not issued nor guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority, is not 
necessarily attached to a legally established currency and does not possess a legal status of 
currency or money but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of exchange and 
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By contrast, creditors and debtors of monetary obligations may freely pick 
out the currency they prefer, but the European Banking Authority (EBA) has 
warned virtual currency holders about the risks they are assuming, addressing 
operational, legal, and financial risks60, beginning with the deceptive nature 
of the word “currency”. Indeed, EBA has considered virtual currencies as a 
«digital representation of value that is neither issued by a central bank or a 
public authority nor necessarily attached to a FC [fiat currency], but it is used 
by natural or legal persons as a means of exchange and can be transferred, 
stored or traded electronically»61. In addition, EBA has drawn the difference 
between the virtual currencies and banking deposits, stressing that the virtual 
currency holders do not enjoy the deposit guarantee scheme protection in case 
of VC issuers’ default. In the end, EBA has emphasized the normative 
difference between funds and virtual currencies and how only the former - 
namely, coins and banknotes, scriptural money and e-money as set out in the 
2009 European directive - are covered by the rules and regulation on payment 
services laid down in the 2015 Payment Service Directive.  
  
4.3. What regulatory advances?  
 
The bitcoin-like value transfer system represents the latest state of the 
electronification of payments62, marked by a higher level of money 
privatisation. However, the Yap experience seems to teach us that the 
monetary change is not per se something positive63.  
Indeed, it seems sensible to believe that the VC system may better off the 
financial inclusion levelling down the money remittance fees, especially those 
towards Third Countries, but  it would be advisable to ascertain whether 
bitcoin-like virtual currency schemes may address some of the regulatory 
drawbacks or market bottlenecks raised by the regular payment system. To 
 
which can be transferred, stored and traded electronically» (art. 3, n. 18). Despite this 
normative definition, laid down for the application of the AML rules and regulations, there is 
great legal uncertainty on the juridical nature of the bitcoin-like virtual currencies. An overview 
of the academic positions: VARDI, Bit by bit: assessing the legal nature of virtual currencies, in 
GIMIGLIANO (ed), Bitcoin and mobile payments. Constructing a European Union Framework, 
Palgrave Studies in Financial Services Technology, London, 2016, 55 - 71. 
60 EBA, Warning to consumers on virtual currencies, 12 December 2013; EBA, Opinion 
on “virtual currencies”, 4 July 2014; EBA, Report with advice for the European commission 
on crypto-assets, 9 January 2019.   
61 EBA, Opinion on “virtual currencies”, cit., 11. 
62 See: PILKINGTON, op. cit. 
63 Supra, Part I.   
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this end, this section will focus on two of them: the credit crunch, closely 
connected to overdraft regulatory conditions, and the governance of payment 
systems as four-party payment platforms.  
 Concerning the first aspect, «If a customer draws on an account which has 
inadequate funds, it is regarded as being a request to the bank for an 
overdraft»64 and since the 2000 Cruickshank Report, overdraft is addressed as 
a grey area of competition. It has underscored how the price of overdraft is 
not driving the choice of current account. More recently, the analysis of the 
European legal framework from a competition law standpoint shows how the 
bottleneck of this market is the credit access and the overdraft conditions. 
From the investigation of the Commission and the Court of Justice case law 
comes out that the current or payment accounts have a tying effect because 
they are at the crossroads between the access to credit and the operation of 
payment operations. 
This is why, since the 2007 Payment Service Directive, the European 
policymaker has allowed payment institutions not only to operate payment 
transactions but also to extend credit through their own funds, with a view to 
improving market conditions. Indeed, «payment institutions may grant credit 
relating to payment services (…) if all of the following conditions are met: (a) 
the credit shall be ancillary and granted exclusively in connection with the 
execution of a payment transaction; (b) notwithstanding national rules on 
providing credit by credit cards, the credit granted with a payment (…) shall 
be repaid within a short period which shall in no case exceed 12 months; (c) 
such credit shall not be granted from the funds received or held for the 
purpose of executing a payment transaction; (d) the own funds of the payment 
institution shall at all times and to the satisfaction of the supervisory 
authorities be appropriate in view of the overall amount of credit granted»65.  
Turning to the bitcoin-like virtual currency schemes, these are unlikely to 
improve the state of the overdraft market. Insofar as they are based on a logic 
of «digital metallism»66, where promises of «materiality, privacy, and 
community»67 are underwritten and backed by an algorithm, they are far from 
enjoying the degree of flexibility required to meet users’ credit needs. 
 
64  WADSLEY - PENN, Banking Law, vol. I, London, 2000.   
65 Art. 18, § 4, 2015 Payment Service Directive. 
66 MURRAY ET ALT., “When perhaps the real problem is money itself!”: the practical 
materiality of Bitcoin, in Social Semiotics, March 2013, available at: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10350330.2013.777594  
67 MURRAY ET ALT., “When perhaps the real problem is money itself!”: the practical 
materiality of Bitcoin, in Social Semiotics, March 2013, available at: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10350330.2013.777594  
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Coming to the governance of payment systems as two-sided and four-party 
platforms: it is a matter of intra-system competition. The case in point is 
Cartes Bancaires , where the Court of Justice overturned the ruling of the 
General Court (and, in turn, the European Commission’s decision) on some 
pricing measures, established the CB Members scheme, setting «certain fees 
to be paid by CB Group members depending on their card issuing/acquisition 
of merchants ratio». While the CB Group addressed them as a regulatory 
device to solve a free-riding problem on the issuing side, the Commission held 
that they were a form of by object restriction because the «purpose of the 
measures was to keep the price of payment cards artificially high to the 
advantage of the major banks of the CB Group and to the detriment of new 
entrants»68. This case may demonstrate the delicate trade-off between the 
newcomers’ and the incumbents’ interests in intra-system competition In 
addition, it reveals how art. 35, 2015 Payment Service Directive (former art. 
28, 2007 Payment Service Directive), mentioned above69, is far from 
providing a workable solution to the governance bottleneck.  So the question 
is: might bitcoin blockchain be able to cope with this regulatory issue? 
One might assume that the asserted decentralised nature of permissionless 
blockchain may cope with this regulatory bottleneck. However, Angela Walch 
has convincingly stressed the risk of the so-called streetlight effect, «paying 
attention only to matters that have been illuminated, and not to ones remaining 
in the dark. The name of the effect comes from the parable of a man who 
looked for his lost glasses only in places illuminated by a streetlight, not 
because he thought he had lost them there, but because that is where he could 
see. Here, the fact that the node networks of the Bitcoin and Ethereum systems 
are extensive and global is relatively well known and nodes are easily 
countable (in the gleam of the streetlight), while the roles of software 
developers, miners, and even nodes in governance are complex and poorly 
understood (in the shadows), so these actors who strongly influence the 
success or the failure of a blockchain system remain unremarked»70. As far as 
the concentration of decision-making power remains in the dark, there is no 
room for competition law in cases of market distortion. 
 
 
68 CALZADO - SCORDAMAGLIA TOUSIS, Groupement Cartes Bancaires v. Commission: 
shedding light on what is not a “by object” restriction of competition, in Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, 2015 (18), 1 - 3.  
69 See above: § 3.2.3.   
70 WALCH, Deconstructing “Decentalization”. Exploring the core claim of crypto systems, 
59 ff. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
The “privatisation” of money represents a long-standing process; it is 
based on technological innovation, changing from time to time. In the case of 
the story of rai stones, the impact of the technology through the intervention 
of a “private actor” (captain O’Keefe) had a negative effect on the local 
economy of Yap - though ‘multiplying’ the (nominal) availability of money 
(Part I). In turn, Part II has addressed an evolution rather than a revolution, 
from the paper-based negotiable instruments, to the electronic transfers of 
funds and the blockchain-based virtual currencies, featured by different 
degree of decentralisation.  
 In this light, apart from the feeling of pretty euphoria for the new frontiers 
of the electronification process, the recent financial and sovereign debt crisis 
on the one side and the sustainable development goals, on the other side, 
remind us that paper, virtual or digital money «itself cannot have inherent 
value as a substance. Whatever it represents must be the basis of a social 
agreement»71 and any social agreement mirrors a constitutional project about 
money in which the money holders trust72. 
The link that this paper has made between the story of the ancient rai stones 
in relation to contemporary bitcoins (as represented in the art installation by 
Mangan) and the process of electronification (as regulated by the European 
Union) may provide useful interpretive tools to consider how much 
“technological value” cannot substitute the “substantive value” of social 
agreement and so the role of the community to determine how money affects 
growth. In other terms, how the Limits to Growth are necessarily connected to 
social policies aimed at locating the value of money in a market functioning 
through the participation of all the economic actors.  
In this direction, the issues of negotiability and financial inclusion also 
remind us that “bona fides”, that is to say “mutual trust” in monetary 
exchanges, is never created by technology but grounded on shared social 
value. And that, to guarantee, preserve and supervise the dynamics of this 
shared social value in a global economy (where stones, coin or paper money 
are substituted by digital money) represents a challenge that regulators have 
still to face in its entirety. 
 
71 MELLOR, The future of money. From financial crisis to public resources, London, 2010.  
72 DESAN, Making money: coin, curency, and the coming of capitalism, Oxford, 2014. 
